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IF SHE CONSENTED ONCE, SHE CONSENTED
AGAIN-A LEGAL FALLACY IN FORCIBLE
RAPE CASES
INTRODUCTION
The defense lawyer [in a forcible rape case], view-
ing the jury . . . as an ally, plays his advantage to the
hilt. He cross-examines the victim mercilessly-in one
case a woman was on the stand for nine hours-asking
all the outrageous questions about her sex life he can
get away with. For example: "Isn't it true that you've
gone to bed with 12 men in the past year?"'
With such courtroom inquiries into the complainant's past
sexual misconduct, the defense attorney often manages to dis-
credit all of the victim's testimony.2 Through the utilization of
this line of questioning or by the production of extrinsic evidence
concerning the complainant's prior unchastity3 the defense pre-
sents a substantial obstruction-if not an insurmountable bar-
rier-to the prosecution's attempt to prove the guilt of the al-
leged rapist. It is the validity or, perhaps, the invalidity of such
an inquiry that is the main concern of this note.
Rape is the unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman by a man
forcibly and against her will.- It is said to be one of the easiest
crimes to allege and one of the most difficult to prove.' The
prosecution's evidentiary burden in the rape proceeding is heavier
than in other criminal cases. The prosecutor must prove not only
that an act of sexual intercourse took place, but also that the
alleged victim was an unwilling participant to that act. Since
rape is seldom witnessed by third parties, the prosecutrix is often
the sole witness available to the prosecution. Only through her
1. A. Lake, What Women Are Doing About the Ugliest Crime, GooD
HOUSEKEEPING, Aug., 1974, at 134.
2. Revolt Against Rape, TIME, July 21, 1974, at 85.
3. Unchastity is defined generally as the willing participation of an
unmarried female in one or more acts of sexual intercourse with a man, or
the consensual involvement of a married woman in extra-marital sexual in-
tercourse with a man other than her husband. See State v. Brionez, 188 Neb.
488, 197 N.W.2d 639 (1972); Marshall v. Territory, 2 Okla. Crim. 136, 101 P.
139 (1904).
4. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1427 (4th ed. 1968). See Gore v. State,
119 Ga. 418, 46 S.E. 671 (1904).
5. M. HALE, 1 THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 635 (1778).
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testimony and physical evidence can the prosecution meet the
formidable burden of evidence necessary to obtain a conviction
of the defendant. If the complainant's testimony is improperly
discredited, a strong possibility exists that the rapist might be
wrongfully acquitted.
Presently, many jurisdictions permit the defense to discredit
the testimony of the complainant with proof of her prior con-
sensual sexual activities.' Some courts admit the evidence as rele-
vant to the issue of her consent to the alleged act ;" others permit
it only to impeach the complainant's credibility as a witness.' Re-
gardless of the reason for its admission, "[t]he effect in the
courtroom will be that prior sexual activity of any kind will con-
tinue as an issue in an unknown number of trials, with the victim
put on trial for being human."9
Should the practice of admitting the complainant's sexual
history continue to be permitted in the rape trial? It is clear that
the defendant must be proffered every fair opportunity to defend
against a false accusation and a possible erroneous conviction.
6. See notes 11-48 infra and accompnnying text. Evidence concerning
the sexual history of the rape complainant is usually admitted at the discre-
tion of the trial court judge. See generally United States v. Craft, 407 F.2d
1065, 1070 (6th Cir. 1969); C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185 (2d
ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]. However, the rape statutes of
some states require proof of the rape complainant's chastity as a condition
precedent to any possible conviction of the defendant. These statutes provide
that rape can be perpetrated only upon a female of previous chaste character.
See B. OLIVER JR., SEXUAL DEVIATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 57 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as OLIVER]. An example of such a statute is TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-3706 (Supp. 1974), which provides that "a bawd, lewd or kept
female" may not charge rape against a male. The present discussion, al-
though applicable to such a statutory situation, is concerned primarily with that
evidence which is admissible at the court's discretion.
7. E.g., McQuirk v. State, 84 Ala. 435, 4 So. 775 (1887); Teague v. State,
208 Ga. 459, 67 S.E.2d 467 (1951) ; People v. Collins, 25 Ill. 2d 605, 186 N.E.2d
30 (1962); Esquivel v. State, 506 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Haynes
v. State, 498 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
8. E.g., Brown v. State, 291 Ala. 789, 280 So. 2d 177 (1973); Williams
v. State, 51 Ala. App. 1, 282 So. 2d 399 (1973); Camp v. State, 3 Ga. 417
(1847); Humphreys v. State, 227 Md. 115, 175 A.2d 777 (1961); Redmon v.
State, 150 Neb. 62, 33 N.W.2d 349 (1948).
9. MICHIGAN WOMEN'S TASK FORCE ON RAPE, Position Statement #2,
Proposed Amend. to Mich. H.B. 5802, Introduced by Representatives O'Neil,
Divey, Zigler and Nelson (1974). See also Coakley, The Joan Little Trial Is
Over But the Issues Remain, Chicago Tribune, August 24, 1975, § 2, at 8, col.
1. "[R]ape victims . . . have to take the witness stand and become the
defendant."
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However, it is equally clear that the prosecution, in its endeavor
to protect society from the criminal act, must not be unjustly
obstructed in proving the defendant's guilt.
In rendering the ultimate decision concerning the admissi-
bility of such evidence, this note first considers whether proof of
the complainant's prior sexual behavior is relevant to the issues
of consent and credibility. That evidence which is relevant is then
subjected to a second test. This latter test determines whether
it is so inflammatory, prejudicial or confusing as to outweigh its
probative value-thus necessitating its exclusion from the trial. 0
If the offered evidence passes each of these tests, then, and only
then, should it be admitted in the rape proceeding. However, it
shall be revealed that much of the evidence currently deemed ad-
missible does not, in fact, meet these necessary qualifications.
Consequently, it is concluded that much of that evidence should
be excluded from the rape trials.
Finally, the current legislation concerning the evidence of
the alleged rape victim's sexual history will be examined. This
evaluation covers the content, the scope and the probable effect
of these newly-enacted statutes, as well as identifying the remain-
ing problems not remedied with such legislation.
It is hoped that this discussion will better acquaint one with
both the present status and the inherent problems concerning
evidence of the rape complainant's prior sexual activity. Affirma-
tive action taken upon these suggestions may alleviate some of
the present inequities of the rape trial. Before determining which
evidence should be admissible, it is perhaps best to begin with an
analysis of the type of evidence presently admitted concerning the
sexual history of the rape complainant.
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING
THE COMPLAINANT'S PRIOR SEXUAL ACTIVITY
The admissibility in a rape trial of evidence of the com-
plainant's character for chastity or unchastity has long been con-
ceded." Many authorities have concluded that such character
evidence is competent as bearing on the probability of her con-
sent to the alleged act with the defendant.'" As stated by Pro-
10. See notes 96-99 infra and accompanying text.
11. See McQuirk v. State, 84 Ala. 435, 4 So. 775 (1887); Pleasant v.
State, 15 Ark. 624 (1855).
12. See McQuirk v. State, 84 Ala. 435, 4 So. 775 (1887).
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fessor Wigmore, "The non-consent of the complainant is here a
material element, and the character of the woman as to chastity
is of considerable probative value in judging the likelihood of
that consent.""3 An example of how the jury is instructed to con-
sider such evidence is illustrated in People v. Crego :"'
I should say this, however: that if the girl had followed
a dissolute life, and been guilty of having sexual inter-
course with boys as often as the opportunity offered,
here and there, you would have a right to take that into
consideration in coming to your conclusion as to whether
the connection in this case was had against her will
or not.'"
Although evidence of the prosecutrix's unchastity has been
admitted with little opposition, the permitted form of such evi-
dence has been more vehemently contested. There is strong dis-
pute whether the evidence should be presented in the form of
one's opinion of the complainant's unchaste character, her repu-
tation in the community for unchastity, or her specific acts of
sexual misconduct.' 6 Upon scrutiny of the case law concerning
such character evidence, it becomes clear that the complainant's
previous want of chastity is most often demonstrated by proof
of her reputation for unchastity."'
Evidence Concerning Her Reputation for Unchastity
The Supreme Court," many lower federal tribunals," and
numerous state courts" have approved the admission of evidence
13. 'J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 279, § 62 (2d ed. 1923) [here-
inafter cited as WIGMORE].
14. 70 Mich. 319, 38 N.W. 281 (1888). This instruction was given to
the jury despite the defendant's testimony that he had to strike the victim
to make her lie still.
15. Id. at 320, 38 N.W. at 282.
16. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 186, at 443.
17. See notes 11-17 supra and accompanying text.
18. Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967). Here, after the conviction
of the defendant, the district court ordered a new trial. The court of appeals
reversed that order; and the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the
court of appeals, holding that the defendant had been denied due process
when the prosecution suppressed certain evidence favorable to the defendant,
concerning the complainant's sexual habits. Such reputation evidence was
considered necessary for the defendant despite the fact that the rape was
rather apparent. As mentioned in the dissent:
"Consent" is of course the conventional defense in rape cases. In
light of the forcible entry into the car occupied by the victim, the
[Vol. 10
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concerning the rape complainant's reputation for unchastity. There
are two basic rationales for allowing the introduction of such
evidence. First, the evidence is admitted substantively to demon-
strate the probability of the complainant's consent to the act in
question. This admission is founded on the underlying premise
that it is more probable that an unchaste woman would assent
to sexual intercourse than would a virtuous woman.2 In one
example, evidence of the complainant's reputation for lewdness
was admitted for the purpose of illustrating the probability of
her consent despite the undisputed fact that the prosecutrix was
forcibly pushed into the car of the four alleged rapists and that
her physical examination disclosed very strong manifestations of
a forcible rape." The court noted that "in practically all juris-
dictions it is permissible to show her general character for lewd-
ness [as proved by her reputation], as evidence seeking to dis-
prove . . . that the act was forcible and against her consent.""
However, as a general rule in prosecutions for forcible rape, evi-
assault upon her companion, and her flight into the woods, it would
have been extraordinary for the jury to have believed that this girl
freely invited these youths to have sexual relations with her.
Id. at 103 n.1. Yet, since the defendants claimed that the complainant had
disrobed herself and had invited all three to have sexual relations with her,
the court held that there was ample evidence to indicate consent as to justify
the admission of her sexual history into evidence.
19. E.g., Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1968); Packineau v.
United States, 202 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1953); Lovely v. United States, 175
F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1949); Tanksley v. United States, 145 F.2d 58 (9th Cir.
1944).
20. E.g., Brown v. State, 291 Ala. 789, 280 So. 2d 177 (1973); Wil-
liams v. State, 51 Ala. App. 1, 282 So. 2d 349 (1973); Nickels v. State, 90
Fla. 659, 106 So. 479 (1925); Black v. State, 119 Ga. 746, 47 S.E. 370 (1904);
People v. Collins, 25 Ill. 2d 605, 186 N.E.2d 30 (1962); Shirwin v. People, 69
Ill. 56 (1873); People v. Eilers, 18 Ill. App. 3d 198, 309 N.E.2d 627 (1974);
State v. Jack, 285 So. 2d 204 (La. 1973); Humphreys v. State, 227 Md. 115,
175 A.2d 777 (1961); Commonwealth v. McKay, 294 N.E.2d 213 (Mass. 1973);
State v. Wulff, 194 Minn. 271, 260 N.W. 515 (1935); Wilson v. State, 264
So. 2d 828 (Miss. 1972); State v. Kain, 330 S.W.2d 842 (Mo. 1960); People
v. Tashman, 233 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1962); Woods v. People, 55 N.Y. 515 (1874);
People v. Abbot, 19 Wend. 192 (1838); State v. Cole, 20 N.C. App. 137, 201
S.E.2d 100 (1973) ; State v. Apley, 25 N.D. 298, 141 N.W. 740 (1913) ; McDer-
mott v. State, 13 Ohio St. 331 (1862); State v. McManus, 267 Ore. 238, 517
P.2d 250 (1973); Esquivel v. State, 506 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974);
State v. Reed, 39 Vt. 417 (1867).
21. People v. Collins, 25 Ill. 2d 605, 186 N.E.2d 30, 33 (1962). See also
Comment, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 919,
935 (1973).
22. Teague v. State, 208 Ga. 459, 67 S.E.2d 467 (1951).
23. Id. at 463, 67 S.E.2d at 471.
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dence of the prior unchastity of the prosecutrix is inadmissible
as a substantive defense.2' Such evidence is considered competent
only after the defendant asserts that the complainant consented
to the alleged act.2
In addition to the issue of consent, evidence of the com-
plainant's reputation for unchastity is admitted in many courts
to demonstrate her lack of credibility as a witness.2" This ad-
mission is based upon the theory that a person of questionable
moral character is less likely to speak the truth than one of good
moral character.2 ' Many courts have predicated their holdings
on the logic of State v. Coella:2
She [the prosecution witness] could not have ruthlessly
destroyed that quality [chastity] upon which most other
good qualities are dependent, and for which, above all
others, a woman is reverenced and respected, and yet re-
tain her credit for truthfulness unsmirched... .29
24. State v. Ballamah, 28 N.M. 212, 210 P. 391 (1922), Annot., 26
A.L.R. 769 (1923); Esquivel v. State, 506 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974);
Haynes v. State, 498 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
25. C. Bohmer, Judicial Attitudes Toward Rape Victims, 57 JUDiCATURE
303, 304 (1974). To the accusation of rape, the defendant responds with one
of three basic defenses: (1) that the alleged offense never took place; (2) that
sexual intercourse between the defendant and the complainant did take place,
but it was consensual; or (3) that the rape occurred, but the defendant is
not the rapist. It is the second of these which this note is primarily concerned.
26. E.g., Brown v. State, 291 Ala. 789, 280 So. 2d 177 (1973); Williams
v. State, 51 Ala. App. 1, 282 So. 2d 349 (1973); Camp v. State, 3 Ga. 417
(1847); Jones v. Commonwealth, 154 Ky. 648, 157 S.W. 1079 (1913); Humph-
reys v. State, 227 Md. 115, 175 A.2d 777 (1961); State v. Kain, 330 S.W.2d 842
(Mo. 1960); State v. Sibley, 132 Mo. 102, 33 S.W. 167 (1895); Redmon v.
State, 150 Neb. 62, 33 N.W.2d 349 (1948); State v. Cole, 20 N.C. App. 137,
201 S.E.2d 100 (1973).
27. See Brown v. State, 291 Ala. 789, 280 So. 2d 177 (1973). In Camp v.
State, 3 Ga. 417, 422 (1847), the Georgia Supreme Court observed:
[NJo evil habitude of humanity so deprives the nature, so deadens the
moral sense, and obliterates the distinctions between right and wrong
as common licentious indulgence. Particularly is this true of women,
the citadel whose character is virtue; when that is lost, all is gone:
her love of justice, sense of character, and regard for truth.
Jones v. Commonwealth, 154 Ky. 648, 157 S.W. 1079 (1913); Redmond v.
State, 150 Neb. 62, 33 N.W.2d 349 (1948). See also 3 GREENLEAF, A TEATISH
ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 203, § 214 (14th ed. 1883).
28. 3 Wash. St. 99, 28 P. 28 (1891). In Coella, it was held that to
exclude cross-examination of the prosecuting witness as to whether she was
a prostitute constituted reversible error in a murder trial.
29. Id. at 106, 28 P. at 29.
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From this analysis of the case law, it is obvious that the
complainant's prior sexual reputation is admitted in many rape
cases, as bearing on the issues of consent and credibility. How-
ever, there is yet another form of such evidence that is often
deemed admissible-evidence of the complainant's specific acts
of sexual misconduct.
Evidence Concerning Her Specific Acts of Unchastity
It is generally accepted that the unchaste character of the
complainant is admissible to show the probability of her consent
to the intercourse at issue." The question arises whether par-
ticular acts of the woman's unchastity can be admitted, as show-
ing her to be a person more prone than another to have con-
sented. Professor Wigmore once wrote that "no question of evi-
dence has been more controverted."3 ' It is Wigmore's opinion
that such proof should be permitted.2
The better view seems to be that which admits the evi-
dence. Between the evil of putting an innocent or per-
haps erring woman's security at the mercy of a villain
and the evil of putting an innocent man's liberty at the
mercy of an unscrupulous and revengeful mistress, it is
hard to strike a balance. But with regard to the in-
tensity of injustice involved in an erroneous verdict, and
the practical frequency of either danger, the admission
of the evidence seems preferable."
Evidence concerning the complainant's specific acts of un-
chastity and immorality is excluded in the greater number of
jurisdictions." Nevertheless, there are many cases where such
evidence has been allowed-based primarily on the Wigmore ra-
tionale. 5 The classic opinion in favor of its admissibility is ex-
pressed in People v. Abbott :36
30. See notes 7 and 21 supra and accompanying text.
31. WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 200 at 435.
32. Id. at 436.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 437. See also 3 UNDERHILL, UNDERHILL'S CRIMINAL EVIENCE
1766, § 766 (5th ed. 1957).
35. See WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 200 at 437-38. An example of such
a case is State v. Wulff, 194 Minn. 271, 260 N.W. 515 (1935), where the
court adopted the general rule that evidence of particular acts of immorality
unconnected with the crime charged as well as evidence of one's general
reputation for sexual misconduct is admissible to prove want of chastity on
the part of the prosecutrix.
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The prosecutrix is usually, as here, the sole witness to
the principal facts, and the accused is put to rely for his
defense on circumstantial evidence. Any fact tending to
the inference that there was not the utmost resistance is
always received . . . . [T] he connection must be abso-
lutely against the will; and are we to be told that pre-
vious prostitution shall not make one among those cir-
cumstances which raise a doubt of assent? that triers
should be advised to make no distinction in their minds
between the virgin and a tenant of the stew, between
one who would prefer death to pollution and another
who, incited by lust and lucre, daily offers her person
to the indiscriminate embraces of the other sex? . . .
And will you not readily infer assent in. the practiced
Messalina in loose attire, than in the reserved and vir-
tuous Lucretia? . . . It has been repeatedly adjudged
that in the same view you may also show a previous
voluntary connection between the prosecutrix and the
prisoner. Why is this? Because there is not so much
probability that a common prostitute or the prisoner's
concubine would withhold her assent as one less de-
praved, and may I not ask, does not the same probable
distinction arise between one who has already submitted
herself to the lewd embraces of another, and the coy and
modest female severely chaste and instinctfully shudder-
ing at the thought of impurity? Shall I be answered
that both are equally under the protection of the law?
That I admit, and so are the common prostitute and the
concubine. If either have in truth been feloniously ray-
ished, the punishment is the same, but the proof is quite
different. It requires that the stronger evidence be added
to the oath of the prosecutrix in one case than in the
other.3 '
The federal courts have also allowed evidence concerning the
The crime of rape is so abhorent that, to some minds to charge a
person with it raises a presumption of guilt .... It is human nature
to incline to the story of the female .... Hence all the authorities
agree that this is a crime requiring special scrutiny by the jury,
and a careful weighing of all the evidence and all remote and near
circumstances and probabilities.
260 N.W. at 576.
36. 19 Wend. 192 (1838).
37. Id. at 194-96.
[Vol. 10
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prosecutrix's specific acts of immorality." In one of these cases,"
it was proven that the complainant's clothes had been badly torn
and that she had suffered physical injury as a result of the sexual
attack. Nevertheless, the court of appeals reversed the defend-
ant's conviction, holding that the exclusion of evidence concern-
ing the prosecutrix's previous acts of unchastity with a man other
than the defendant was tantamount to prejudicial error."° It was
hypothesized that the complainant's story of having been raped
would be more readily believed by a person who was ignorant of
any former unchaste conduct on her part than it would be by a
person cognizant of her unchaste activity. The court concluded:
To exclude the tendered proof of her concupiscence of
her having sexual lust and unlawfully indulging in it,
is simply to remove actual and real fairness from the
trial and to reach judgment from mere appearances."
Until now, the discussion about the specific acts of sexual
misconduct has concerned those activities of the prosecutrix with
persons other than the defendant. It should also be noted that
when the particular act of prior unchastity is with the defendant,
courts are much more likely to admit such evidence. It is gen-
erally accepted that the defendant may demonstrate that the
prosecutrix had previously indulged in sexual intercourse with
him for the purpose of raising an implication of her consent to
the intercourse in dispute. 2 Such evidence bears directly on the
question whether, having yielded once to sexual intercourse with
the defendant, she would not be likely to yield again to the same
person. 3
38. E.g., Packineau v. United States, 202 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1953).
Accord, Lovely v. United States, 175 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1949); Tanksley v.
United States, 145 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1944).
39. Packineau v. United States, 202 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1953).
40. The excluded evidence concerned the time some months prior to the
night in question: while picking potatoes in North Dakota, the prosecutrix
had cohabited for five days and nights with a young man, holding herself
out to be married to him. Although reversed by the appellate court, the trial
court had sustained the prosecution's objection that such evidence was in-
competent, irrelevant and immaterial.
41. Packineau v. United States, 202 F.2d 681, 686 (8th Cir. 1953).
42. State v. Wood, 59 Ariz. 48, 122 P.2d 416 (1942), Annot., 140 A.L.R.
361 (1942); Lewis v. State, 217 Miss. 488, 64 So. 2d 634 (1953); Brown v.
State, 72 Miss. 997, 17 So. 2d 278 (1895).
43. State v. Wood, 59 Ariz. 48, 122 P.2d 416 (1942); Moffett v. State,
223 Miss. 276, 78 So. 2d 142 (1955); Lewis v. State, 217 Miss. 488, 64 So. 2d
634 (1953) ; Brown v. State, 72 Miss. 997, 17 So. 278 (1895).
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Some courts have also admitted evidence which was offered
to prove only that the prosecutrix had sexual passion for the de-
fendant." Wigmore was convinced that a sexual desire of A for
B is relevant to indicate the probability of A's doing that which
will realize this desire.45 Professor Wigmore concluded that the
conduct receivable to prove this desire is whatever would natu-
rally be interpreted as the expression of sexual passion: the typi-
cal sort of such conduct would be sexual intercourse, but indecent
or otherwise improper familiarities would be equally significant."'
Thus, it is maintained that proof of former acts of intimacy (short
of intercourse) between the defendant and the complainant fur-
nishes a predicate for the inference of consent to the intercourse
in question. This underlying rationale was further elaborated in
Bass v. State,4" where the court observed:
Proof of such lascivious conduct between the parties ...
in accordance with observations of human conduct, shows
a tendency or disposition in each party towards the com-
mission of the sexual act with the other; it shows that
modesty and self-respect-strong safeguards to virtue-
had been previously broken down, and that the parties
were already of such terms of lascivious intimacy as to
render it probable that, given the opportunity, they would
indulge in sexual intercourse with each other.4
This analysis has been confined to the admissibility of evi-
dence concerning the prior sexual activity of the rape complain-
ant (as proved by her reputation for unchastity and her specific
acts of sexual misconduct) and the grounds upon which such ad-
missibility is predicated. At this point it becomes necessary to
consider whether or not the practice of admitting this evidence
should be permitted to continue in light of present statistics,
opinions and case law concerning rape, its victims and its trials.
44. Lewis v. State, 217 Miss. 488, 64 So. 2d 634 (1953); State v.
Northern, 472 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. 1971); State v. Pruitt, 202 Mo. 49, 100 S.W.
431 (1907); French v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. R. 571, 85 S.W. 4 (1905); State v.
Neel, 23 Utah 541, 65 P. 494 (1901); State v. Hilberg, 22 Utah 27, 61 P.
215 (1900).
45. WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 399(a), at 738.
46. Id., § 399(c), at 739.
47. 103 Ga. 227, 29 S.E. 966 (1897).
48. Id. at 228, 29 S.E. at 967.
[Vol. 10
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THE RELEVANCY OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING
THE COMPLAINANT'S PRIOR SEXUAL ACTIVITY
Evidence, to be admissible in criminal trials, must be strictly
relevant to the particular offense charged.49 The determination
of relevancy is neither automatic nor mechanical. Courts cannot
employ a precise and technical test for relevancy; instead they
must apply logical standards applicable in everyday life.5" Rele-
vancy has been variously defined, but, reduced to its essentials, it
describes the relationship between a proffered item of evidence
and a proposition which is provable or material in a given case."
To be relevant in a criminal proceeding, the evidence must logi-
cally, naturally and by reasonable inference establish that mate-
rial fact for which it is being offered.2 Evidence should be ex-
cluded as irrelevant for either of two distinct reasons: because
it is not probative of the proposition at which it is directed or
because that proposition is not provable in the case." With this
brief explanation of relevancy serving as a guideline, it is now
appropriate to examine whether or not evidence concerning the
prior sexual activities of the complainant is relevant in the rape
trial.
Sexual Activity with Third Persons Is Irrelevant
To the Issue of Consent
Courts have consistently treated evidence relative to a com-
plainant's sexual contacts with others as relevant in a rape trial.
49. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949).
50. United States v. Allison, 474 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1973). Relevancy
may be measured by experience or by common sense. See United States v.
Craft, 407 F.2d 1065, 1069 (6th Cir. 1969); WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 27,
at 231-32. Accord, Marut v. Costello, 39 Ill. 2d 125, 214 N.E.2d 768 (1965).
51. United States v. Allison, 474 F.2d 286, 289 (5th Cir. 1973).
52. People v. Warner, 270 Cal. App. 2d 900, 76 Cal. Rptr. 160 (1969).
"In legal usage, relevancy means the logical relationship between proposed
evidence and a fact to be established, the tendency to establish a material
proposition." State v. Wilson, 173 N.W.2d 563, 565 (Iowa 1970). A Texas
court has stated:
Relevancy is defined to be that which conduces to the proof of a per-
tinent hypothesis-a pertinent hypothesis being one which, if sus-
tained, would logically influence the issue. Hence it is relevant to
put in evidence any circumstance which tends to make the proposition
at issue either more or less probable.
Richardson v. State, 127 Tex. Crim. 479, 480, 77 S.W.2d 215, 217 (1935).
"Relevancy . . . is the tendency of the evidence to establish a material
proposition." MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 185, at 435.
53. See G. James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CALIF. L. REV.
689, 691 (1941).
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The theory traditionally employed is that if she consented once
to illicit sexual intercourse, it is more probable that she consented
again on the occasion in issue."' This initial assumption, how-
ever, is ultimately invalid. Evidence concerning the complain-
ant's past sexual conduct with third persons is really irrelevant to
the issue of whether or not she consented to the act of intercourse
in question."
There is no convincing argument nor authoritative evidence
which suggests that a woman who engaged in unchaste sexual
activity with one man is incapable of refusing this same activity
with another. Additionally, there is nothing to indicate that con-
sent on one occasion produces a propensity to consent whenever the
opportunity arises. The female complainant has the ability and
the right to make an individual decision with respect to each per-
son on each occasion."6 Consent with one man does not imply
consent with another. Consequently, the victim's lack of chastity
has little, if any, probative value on the issue of consent."'
There has been some support for the proposition that proof
of the complainant's sexual unchastity is irrelevant whether it re-
veals a single act of sexual misconduct or frequent participation
in such behavior with myriad partners." Even evidence to the
effect that the prosecutrix was a nymphomaniac or a prostitute
54. See notes 7 and 21 supra and accompanying text.
55. Letter from Camille LeGrand, Associate in Law, University of
California's School of Law (Berkley), to California Legislators, Mar. 14,
1974, at 1-2. See also M. Coakley, The Joan Little Trial Is Over But the Issues
Remain, Chicago Tribune, § 2, at 1, col. 1, where Mrs. Kathryn Ellison (a
phychologist and rape expert) said, "Actually, giving away sex has no more
in common with rape than giving away money has in common with armed
robbery."
56. Letter from Camille LeGrand, supra note 55, at 4.
57. See Lynn v. State, 231 Ga. 559, 203 S.E.2d 221 (1974); Common-
wealth v. McKay, 294 N.E.2d 213 (Mass. 1973). See also UNDERHILL,
UNDERHILL'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, supra note 34, § 621. The Kentucky court
stated that:
Many courts have expressed the opinion that no inference can be
logically drawn that the prosecutrix voluntarily yielded to the de-
fendant upon the particular occasion from the fact that she had
previously submitted to the embraces of other men, hence that it is
incompetent to prove any of them.
Grigsby v. Commonwealth, 299 Ky. 721, 725, 187 S.W.2d 259, 263 (1945).
58. See generally Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967); Haynes v. State,
498 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
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has been held irrelevant, since it has no tendency to prove her
consent to the act in issue.59
Better-reasoned case authority indicates the falsity of the
assumption underlying the admissibility of such evidence. Despite
the convincing argument disclosed in these cases, the irrelevancy
of such evidence becomes still more apparent in the light of pres-
ent statistics concerning the probable sexual history of the rape
victim.
The probable sexual history of the rape victim is difficult
to ascertain. Statistical information on this subject is greatly
lacking in the available research relative to rape and its victims.
In order to reveal the average sexual history of this victim, an
analogy must be drawn from the sexual backgrounds of all Amer-
ican women within those categories most likely to be raped."
59. Despite the fact that the victim is afflicted with nymphomania,
"there is nothing to show that this made her incompetent as a witness or
that she consented to the acts for which the appelles were convicted." Giles v.
Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 84 (1967) (White, J., concurring). A Texas criminal
court stated that:
Even if it had been shown that the prosecutrix was a prostitute, this
would not have proved consent, or made her any the less a subject
of rape by force. A prostitute does not lose the right of choice, and
may consent or not consent according to her own will.
Haynes v. State, 498 S.W.2d 950, 952 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
60. The majority of rape victims were both young and single. Over
80% of these victims were thirty-five years of age and younger, with over
50% between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four. The median age was twenty-
one. Furthermore, 75% of the victims were unmarried. J. MACDONALD, RAPE:
OFFENDERS AND THEIR VICTIMS 76-77 (1971) [hereinafter cited as MAC-
DONALD].
That category of women most frequently victimized was the 15-19 year
olds. The percentage of all rapes perpetrated on victims of each age grouping
is as follows: 0-10 (7.9%), 10-14 (19.9%), 15-19 (24.9%), 20-24 (13.5%),
25-29 (10.5%), 30-34 (7.7%), 35-39 (6.8%), 40-44 (3.3%), 45-49 (2.8%),
50-54 (1.4%), 55-59 (0.2%), 60 and over (2.0%). M. AMIR, PATTERNS IN
FORCIBLE RAPE (1971) [hereinafter cited as AMIR].
Other research projects detected similar findings. See F. Ludwig, The
Case For Repeal of the Sex Corroboration Requirement in New York, 36
BROOKLYN L. REv. 378 (1969), (the largest number of forcible rape victims
fall within the seventeen-year-old group); Svalastoga, Rape and Social Struc-
tures, 5 PACIFIC SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 48-53 (1969) (77% of the victims were
within the ages of ten to twenty-four, while 50% were between fifteen and
nineteen). CAL. SEXUAL DEVIATION RESEARCH, ch. 5 (1954) (46% of the victims
were within the ages of fourteen to seventeen).
Cf. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 14 (2d ed. 1973), Table 4. This study
shows the average rape victim to be slightly older than the other studies:
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However, that research which has been undertaken suggests that
the relationship between the sexual history of the victim and the
sexual history of the average woman is not as tenuous as it may
seem.' In the vast majority of cases, rapists were unaware of
the sexual histories of their victims. The victim was not attacked
because she was promiscuous or because she had a reputation for
unchastity, but only because she was a woman. The vast majority
of these victims had no prior sexual reputation."2 Consequently,
the majority of all rape complainants are merely average individ-
uals, having average sexual histories.
Upon examination of the sexual histories of both the promis-
cuous and the non-promiscuous women, it becomes clear that proof
of such activities is irrelevant in the rape trial. In discussing the
minority of all rapes-those perpetrated upon females of ill re-
pute-one author has written:
Some men seek out such women with the expectation of
easy sexual gratification. These men overlook the fact
that promiscuous women may yet exercise some choice
in their selection of sexual partners. Furthermore, the
reputation for promiscuity may be based upon false
claims of sexual conquest made by boastful yet frus-
trated acquaintances of the victim. . . When the man's
advances are eventually resisted, he may resort to the
use of force."
Thus, even in cases where the defendant raped the victim whom
he thought to be promiscuous, evidence of her reputation does not
indicate her consent to the intercourse in question. Therefore,
the evidence is irrelevant.
victim ages/rape rates per 100,000 in the population: 10-19 (91), 20-29 (238),
30-39 (104), 40-49 (48).
61. See AMm, supra note 60, Table 44, at 118. This information was
gathered through police interrogation of each offender, offender's witnesses,
and others about the victim's bad reputation or promiscuity (without defining
either term). Every victim was asked if she had had sexual relations with the
offender before the rape; and each victim under the age of eighteen was asked
if she had had any sexual experiences before the rape. The answers indicated
that 80.2% of the victims had no bad reputation. Of the 19.8% of the victims
with a prior reputation, 47.6% were known as promiscuous or having a bad
reputation, 19.5% had had sexual relations with the offender prior to the
rape, 24.2% of the victims under eighteen years of age had had sexual relations
before, and 8.7% had been raped before but did not prosecute.
62. Id.
63. MACDoNALD, supra note 60, at 81.
[Vol. 10
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 [1975], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss1/5
1976] LEGAL FALLACY IN FORCIBLE RAPE CASES 141
As previously established, the vast majority of the rape vic-
tims are merely average females with typical sexual histories.
Upon examination of these sexual histories it becomes clear that
evidence of such backgrounds is also irrelevant to the issues of
a rape trial.
In recent research relating to the sexual habits of the female,
it has been determined that nearly half of all women have had
premarital intercourse before the age of twenty." With further
analysis of these statistics, it becomes apparent that from 14 to
25 percent of all females have had sexual intercourse before they
are sixteen years of age. The percentage of those engaging in
such unchaste activity increases with age. 5 Thus, a significant
proportion of the females within the ages of most frequent rape
victimization have non-marital sexual histories.
However, some of the rape victims are married.' The de-
fense may desire to introduce into evidence the married victim's
extra-marital sexual history in order to prove her propensity to
consent to illicit sexual intercourse. Almost one-fourth of all mar-
ried women have had extra-marital sexual relations.6 8 Of those
64. See R. SORENSEN, ADOLESCENT SEXUALITY IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA
(1973) [hereinafter cited as SORENSEN]. This study determined that 45% of
all females are non-virgins before the age of twenty. The age at first inter-
course of these non-virgin adolescents is as follows: twelve or under (7%),
thirteen (12%), fourteen (11%), fifteen (26%), sixteen (21%), seventeen
(6%), and ages eighteen and nineteen (17%).
See also E. HANKS, A. TARLOCK, & J. HANKS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY 156 (1974), taken from a study by Zelnik and Kantner, Sex and Con-
traception Among Unmarried Teenagers, in TOWARD THE END OF GROWTH 7-18
(C. Westoff ed. 1973). In this study, it was determined that 13.8% of
the females were non-virgins at the age of fifteen, 21.2% at the age of six-
teen, 26.6% at the age of seventeen, 37.1% at the age of eighteen, and 46.1%
were non-virgins at the age of nineteen. Cf. KINSEY, POMEROY, MARLIN & GEE-
HARD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE (1953) [hereinafter cited as
KINSEY]. Kinsey found much lower percentages of adolescent female involve-
ment in sexual intercourse than did the earlier-mentioned studies: 3% of all
women had had coital experience by the age of fifteen, and only 20% had
engaged in such an activity between sixteen and twenty years of age. This
difference may be explained by the fact that Kinsey's research was conducted
at a much earlier date.
65. See note 64 supra.
66. See note 60 supra.
67. AMIR, supra note 60, Table 15, at 64. The marital status of the
victims is as follows: unmarried (69.2%), married (24.5%), separated (2.6%),
divorced (0.5%), widowed (1.5%), no information (1.7%). See MACDONALD,
supra note 61.
68. See KINSEY, supra note 64, at 416, where it was reported that 26%
of all married females commit adultery. In OLIvER, supra note 6, at 186. G.
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married women within the average ages of rape victims, 7 to 10
percent were having relations with men other than their hus-
bands.69 Consequently, many married victims are also likely to
have illicit sexual histories.
Upon delineation and scrutiny of some aspects of these sex-
ual statistics, it becomes evident that proof of one's prior acts
of unchastity does not prove a propensity to consent to every sug-
gested sexual intercourse; and, therefore, it does not prove or
tend to prove that she consented to the act in question. Despite
her personal involvement in such sexual activities, the average
female does not consent indiscriminately. Most women who have
had illicit sexual intercourse have submitted to the sexual em-
braces of a very limited number of partners. Of all potential
unmarried victims with a history of sexual intercourse, over one-
third (35%) have engaged in this form of premarital sex with
only one partner. An additional 22 percent have had two or three
partners. Less than one-fourth of all single, non-virgin women
have had more than six partners."' There is equally no inference
of indiscriminate sex in the illicit histories of the married women:
41 percent restrict extra-marital affairs to a single partner and
40 percent have only two to five partners.'2
In further illustrating that such prior sexual activity is far
from indiscriminate, it is noted that there is often an emotional
tie between the female and her sex partner. Of those unchaste
females within the ages of thirteen to nineteen, 57 percent were
going steady with or planning to marry their partners. Another
25 percent "liked their partner a lot.'" 3 Other studies indicate
that much, if not most, of premarital intercourse occurs only with
74those whom the female loves and eventually marries.
Hamilton reported similar findings-24% of all married women consent to
extra-marital intercourse.
69. KINSEY, supra note 64, at 416.
70. SORENSEN, supra note 64, at 219. See also KINSEY, supra note 64,
where the average number of male coital partners was found to be even more
limited: a single partner (53%), two to five partners (34%), and six or
more partners (13%); Schoffield, The Sexual Behavior of Young People, in
SEXUAL DEVELOPMENTS AND BEHAVIOR 163 (Juhasz ed. 1973), which deter-
mined that of all the American women who consented to premarital intercourse,
nearly half of them reported only one partner and only one-third indicated
several or many partners.
71. SORENSEN, supra note 64, at 219.
72. KINSEY, supra note 64, at 444.
73. SORENSEN, supra note 64, at 198.
74. See THE INDIVIDUAL, SEX, AND SOCIETY 35 (Broderick & Bernard
ed. 1969), where it was disclosed that the majority of all American women
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From these statistics relating to the sexual habits of those
women most likely to be raped, it seems evident that proof of the
female's illicit sexual intercourse with one other than the defend-
ant should be inadmissible in a rape trial for it fails to evidence
a character predisposed to consenting to intercourse whenever
the occasion arises. Although the female very possibly consented
to sexual intercourse with another or others before, she probably
has consented only to a limited number of partners and, even
then, only to those with whom she had strong emotional attach-
ments. The fact that a woman may have engaged in illicit inter-
course with one man is much too slight and uncertain an indica-
tion to warrant a conclusion that she would consent to any man
who sought her favors."5 It takes only common sense to realize
that a female has the right in every circumstance to choose
whether or not she will consent to sexual intercourse. Therefore,
whether measured by experience or by common sense, evidence
of the complainant's former unchastity does not logically, natu-
rally or by reasonable inference establish the fact of her consent
to the intercourse in question-the material fact for which the
evidence is being offered. Since the evidence is not probative of
the proposition at which it is directed, it should be excluded as
irrelevant.
Sexual Acts (Short of Intercourse) with the Defendant Are
Irrelevant to the Issue of Consent
In some courts, the defendant is permitted to prove acts of
intimacy short of coitus between himself and the prosecutrix as
bearing on the issue of consent."6 However, recent statistical com-
pilations indicate that proof of any sexual activity short of inter-
course does not logically imply that intercourse will later occur.
Evidence that the prosecutrix voluntarily submitted to the pas-
sionate embraces, kisses, and sexual caresses of the defendant
does not make more probable the fact that she consented to sexual
intercourse with him. Females consent to kissing and petting
much more frequently and with a predominantly greater number
of men than that which they experience in their coital relation-
have premarital intercourse only with their future husbands; KINSEY, supra
note 64, at 292, reported that 46% of the non-virgin females engaged in
premarital sex only with their then fianc6.
75. See Rice v. State, 35 Fla. 236, 17 So. 286 (1895) ; Comment, Rape and
Rape Laws: Sexism in Society, supra note 21, at 939, "The relationship be-
tween a woman's chastity and whether or not she has been raped is simply too
attentuated to warrant consideration as relevant evidence."
76. See notes 44-48 supra and accompanying text.
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ships. Almost every woman, at an early age, passionately kisses
a man other than her husband." Also, 98 percent of all adoles-
cent girls have consented to premarital sexual petting, while only
45 percent have engaged in illicit sexual intercourse."8
Proof of the number of male partners with whom petting
has been allowed by the female further suggests that the female's
consent to sexual petting is much more indiscriminate than her
assent to sexual intercourse. Kinsey's research revealed that only
10 percent of the females participating in petting confined them-
selves to a single partner before marriage, while about 58 percent
had engaged in such sexual activity with at least six males." As
Kinsey reported, "Nothing approaching this promiscuity in pet-
ting ever enters the female's history of premarital coitus."8
In comparing the statistics of the female's involvement in
petting with the statistical data about her participation in sexual
intercourse,' it becomes apparent that her willingness to engage
in acts of sexual passion other than intercourse is much less lim-
ited and far more indiscriminate. Consequently, evidence which
the defendant might offer concerning the complainant's sexual
passion for him-through proof that she voluntarily submitted to
his kisses and caresses-is not probative of the material fact of
her consent to the intercourse in question. Since the correlation
between petting and coitus is questionable, and since the com-
plainant could still refuse intercourse despite her consensual pet-
ting, proof of her sexual passion for the defendant does not logi-
cally, naturally or by reasonable inference establish the fact of
her consent to sexual intercourse with him. It is irrelevant and
should be excluded from the trial.
77. J. McCARY, HUMAN SEXuALITY 216 (1967) [hereinafter cited at
MCCARY].
78. SORENSEN, supra note 64, at 171. The 98% petting figure is based
on the number of females who have allowed breast contact with males. About
50% of the females have permitted such contact before the age of sixteen,
compared to only 25% (see note 64 supra) who had allowed intercourse by
that age.
79. Of these females engaging in sexual activity with at least six part-
ners 23% had six to ten partners, 16% had eleven to twenty partners, and 19%
had twenty-one or more partners. KINSEY, supra note 64, at 239. It should be
mentioned, however, that the more recent studies of sexual behavior, although
not revealing the number of petting partners, have revealed more sexual per-
missiveness than in the days of Kinsey's sampling. It is then likely that the
female has even more petting partners today than when Kinsey's study was
made.
80. Id.
81. See note 64 supra.
[Vol. 10
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 [1975], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss1/5
1976] LEGAL FALLACY IN FORCIBLE RAPE CASES 145
Prior Sexual Intercourse with the Defendant Is Relevant
To the Issue of Consent
As earlier discussed, evidence of the complainant's previous
sexual intercourse with the defendant is admitted for the purpose of
raising an implication of her consent to the intercourse in ques-
tion.2 It is said that having yielded once to sexual intercourse
with the defendant, she would be more likely to yield again to
the same person. However, unlike the rationale underpinning the
admission of evidence concerning the complainant's intercourse
with one other than the defendant, the reasoning behind admit-
ting evidence of her previous intercourse with the defendant ap-
pears to be well founded in the statistical analysis of the average
female's sexual activities.
Statistics intimate that if a female consented once to a man,
she might very likely consent to that same man on subsequent
occasions. Almost one-fifth (18%) of the non-virgin females
under the age of twenty had consented to their first intercourse
partners on ninety-nine or more subsequent occasions, and about
46 percent had repeated intercourse with that partner at least
seven times.83 Although no figures were available specifically in-
dicating the number of times coitus occurred with each succeed-
ing partner, statistics do indicate a propensity of the female to
participate in sexual conduct rather frequently with a few well-
selected partners. It seems fair to conclude that since the aver-
age unchaste female engages in many acts of sexual intercourse
with a limited number of partners, she probably consents to each
partner on more than one occasion.
82. See notes 42-43 supra and accompanying text.
83. SORENSEN, supra note 64, Table 436, at 211.
84. See generally KINSEY, supra note 64, Tables 76 & 78, at 289-91. Here
it was revealed that over 74% of these females consenting to prior non-marital
intercourse had confined such activity to three years or less. Other figures
indicate that the female was having coitus at an average frequency of about
once in five or ten weeks if she was under twenty years of age, and about
once every three weeks if she was over twenty. Considering, then, that the
female will have consented to the sexual act from thirty to fifty times in her
three year history of sexual intercourse to five or less partners (see notes
70-72 supra and accompanying text), on an average, she will consent to each
at least six times. Figures propounded in SORENSEN, supra note 64, at 225,
indicate that 58% of those non-virgin females who had had sex in the previous
month, had it four or more times in that month. From the limited number
of coital partners that the female has and the number of times she engages
in coitus, the inference seems to be that she has had sex with each partner more
than once.
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If the defense can prove that the complainant willingly par-
ticipated in an act of prior sexual intercourse with the defendant,
it has established that the defendant is one of a very select num-
ber of men with whom the complainant consented to such sexual
activity.85 Furthermore, the evidence fairly implies that the com-
plainant would probably have engaged in sexual relations with
the defendant on more than one occasion (particularly if the de-
fendant was her first coital partner8 6 ). Evidence of prior sexual
intercourse between the defendant and the complainant, then,
would be probative of the proposition at which it is directed-to
prove her consent to the act in question. Her prior intercourse
with the defendant, though quite rare," is usually the only evi-
dence of the complainant's sexual history that is relevant as bear-
ing on the issue of consent.
Unchastity Is Irrelevant to the Issue of Credibility
The general rule in a criminal case is that the credibility of
any witness may not be impeached by showing that the witness
has a general reputation for immorality; such an attack must be
addressed directly to the reputation of the witness for truth and
veracity. However, in the prosecutions of men for sexual crimes
against women, courts have found an exception to this rule and
admit proof of the complainant's unchastity for impeachment
purposes.8 9 It is thought by some that the exception is necessary
to protect the male defendant against "the sinister possibilities of
injustice that lurk in believing such a witness ... .o Yet, in
reality, there is no assurance that permitting that witness' credi-
bility to be attacked by proof of her ill repute for chastity would
85. See notes 70-74 supra and accompanying text.
86. See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
87. Evidence indicating prior consensual sexual intercourse between the
defendant and the complainant will be very rare in rape trials. It has been
revealed that less than four percent of all rape complainants had consented
to previous coital relations with the men they have accused of rape. AMIR,
supra note 60, Table 44, at 118.
88. State v. Kain, 330 S.W.2d 842 (Mo. 1960); State v. Williams, 337
Mo. 884, 87 S.W.2d 175 (1935). Even an offer of proof of a reputation of the
prosecuting witness with regard to a propensity or an inclination to be accusa.
tory against others is not admissible to impeach the credibility of a witness.
Evidence of traits of the witness' character other than honesty and veracity
or their opposites is inadmissible. State v. Mondrosch, 108 N.J. Super. 1, 259
A.2d 725 (1969).
89. See note 8, 26 and 27, supra and accompanying text.
90. 3 WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVDENCE 460, § 924 (a) (3d ed. 1940).
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remedy that situation. In fact, allowing such evidence might open
the door for other and greater abuses."'
Whether or not the complainant in a rape trial is chaste is
hardly relevant to the issue of credibility. If the defense has
proof that the prosecutrix has a habit of telling lies or has made
prior inconsistent statements, it should be permitted to introduce
such, as it is this form of evidence that has a tendency to prove
her untruthfulness. The evidence concerning one's sexual behavior
does not in any manner tend to prove that person's lack of trust-
worthiness. There is relatively little, if any, convincing authority
that even intimates that because a woman is immoral, she is un-
truthful. There is equally no logic behind such an hypothesis.
The evidence merely degrades the witness before the jury; and it
is evident that "[a] witness may not be degraded by accusing him
of improprieties not directly relevant to his veracity.""2
Perhaps one of the clearest judicial opinions in support of this
irrelevancy argument was stated by the Washington Supreme
Court in State v. Wolf :93
If the reputation of the prosecuting witness for chast-
ity were to be held admissible as going to general credi-
bility, then logically such testimony would be equally
admissible as to the credibility of any female who might be
called to give evidence in any case. The court properly
excluded the evidence as to the reputation of the prosecut-
ing witness for unchastity.
* * *
If . . . the trait of chastity has no such definite
correlation with that of veracity as to justify courts in
using the former as a criterion of the latter, then it is
as difficult to see where there is any room for judicial
91. The court in State v. Kain, 330 S.W.2d 842, 845 (Mo. 1960) held,
"There appears to be no logical justification for excepting forcible rape from
the operation of the general rule."
92. Lyda v. United States, 321 F.2d 788, 793 (9th Cir. 1963). In a trial
for armed robbery, the question was propounded on cross-examination of the
defendant's witness whether he had registered at a motel with a certain
young lady. This questioning was ruled improper since it suggested he had
spent the night with a woman not his wife, and it did not affect the witness'
truthfulness.
93. 40 Wash. 2d 648, 245 P.2d 1009 (1952). This court expressly re-
jected the underlying theory upon which many courts admitted evidence of
chastity to prove a witness' credibility-the theory set forth in State v. Coella,
3 Wash. St. 99, 28 P. 28 (1891). See notes 28-29 supra and accompanying text.
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discretion. As long as such discretion is lodged with the
trial courts, questions as to reputation for immoral con-
duct will be asked. It is the asking of such questions in
front of the jury which does the principal damage ...
If the witness' reputation for chastity is so bad that it
has in some way affected his or her reputation for truth
and veracity, then the direct question can be asked as to
reputation for truth and veracity. If the witness' repu-
tation for chastity has not produced this result, then the
jury should not be invited to make this deduction.9"
Furthermore, such evidence need not be admitted in order to
assure the defendant a fair trial. The defense in a rape trial may
impeach the credibility of the prosecuting witness with the same
means available to defendants in other criminal proceedings: with
contradictory evidence, with proof that she made statements in-
consistent from her present testimony, with evidence of her gen-
eral reputation for untruthfulness, with proof of her bias toward
the defendant, or with evidence of records of judgment or felony
convictions.'5 With these numerous and alternative methods of
impeachment available, there is no compelling reason to grant the
defense an opportunity to impeach the prosecutrix with evidence
of her prior unchastity.
Impeachment evidence is allowed only to undermine the credi-
bility of the witness. Since the evidence concerning the complain-
ant's unchastity in no way indicates her lack of truth and veracity,
the evidence simply has no evidentiary bearing on the issue of
credibility. Accusations of other improprieties are clearly not rele-
vant. Consequently, since evidence of the rape victim's unchastity
is not probative of the proposition for which it was offered, it
must be excluded from the rape trial.
It has been demonstrated that much of that evidence pres-
ently accepted is not relevant. It should, therefore, be disallowed.
94. State v. Wolf, 40 Wash. 2d 648, 650, 245 P.2d 1009, 1111-12 (1952).
95. See Echert v. United States, 188 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1951). Accord,
Crawford v. State, 254 Ark. 263, 492 S.W.2d 900 (1973); Lynn v. State, 231
Ga. 559, 203 S.E.2d 221 (1974); McHargue v. Perkins, 295 S.W.2d 301 (Ky.
1956); Rau v State, 133 Md. 613, 105 A. 867 (1919); State v. Kain, 330
S.W. 2d 842 (Mo. 1960). See also MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 33, at 66.
To demonstrate her bias toward the defendant, the complainant may be
cross-examined as to the illicit sexual intercourse with the accused. However,
the details of that illicit relationship can not be inquired into. See Motley
v. State, 207 Ala. 640, 93 So. 508 (1922); Moffett v. State, 233 Miss. 276,
78 So. 2d 142 (1955).
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However, even if such evidence was determined to be relevant,
it still must pass a second examination before it is admitted. It
must now be determined whether the evidence is so inflamma-
tory, prejudicial or confusing as to outweigh any probative value
which it may have had.
THE IMPROPER EFFECTS OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING
THE COMPLAINANT'S PRIOR SEXUAL ACTIVITY
The mere fact that the complainant's sexual history is deter-
mined to be relevant does not indicate that the evidence should
be admitted. There are several counterbalancing factors which
may outweigh its probative value and move a court to exclude
it."' Otherwise relevant evidence may be excluded if (1) it would
create a substantial danger of unduly arousing the jury's emo-
tions of prejudice and hostility; (2) it would unduly confuse the
issues or mislead the jury; (3) it would necessitate an undue con-
sumption of time; or (4) it would unfairly and injuriously sur-
prise a party that had not had a reasonable opportunity to antici-
pate such evidence."" Consequently, the competence of the evi-
dence ultimately depends upon whether it is likely, all things con-
sidered, to advance or facilitate the search for the truth."8 Such
competence does not inexorably follow from the fact that the evi-
dence is rationally relevant.99
Evidence Is Unduly Prejudicial and Inflammatory
In deciding whether the probative value of the evidence con-
cerning the rape complainant's sexual history is outweighed by
other considerations, it must first be determined whether the
evidence has a tendency to unduly inflame the jury's emotions.
The fear is that such evidence will create an atmosphere of hos-
tility toward the complainant, thereby interfering with the jury's
discovery of the truth. To ascertain whether such evidence does
so prejudice the jury, the composition of the jury must be closely
scrutinized, as well as its attitudes, its susceptibility to prejudice
from the proffered evidence, and its ultimate verdicts.
While the primary justification for the use of lay juries is
that they can reflect the conscience and the mores of the commu-
96 MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 185, at 438-39.
97. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948); United States
v. Craft, 407 F.2d 1065 (6th Cir. 1969); State v. Flett, 234 Ore. 124, 380
P.2d 634 (1963); FaD. R. EVID. 403 (1975).
98. Lyda v. United States, 321 F.2d 788, 795-96 (9th Cir. 1963).
99. Daniels v. Dillinger, 445 S.W.2d 410 (Mo. 1969).
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nity, it should be recognized that the "community" is composed
of a number of heterogeneous sub-communities. Under present
systems of jury selection, however, lay juries tend to represent
only one of these numerous sub-communities-that of the Anglo-
Saxon middle class. 0 Consequently, the American jury reflects
only the conscience and mores of this middle class. The result is
an inherent prejudice against the culturally different.
Since the jury is composed primarily of persons from the
white, middle class, it becomes necessary to examine this par-
ticular group's attitude concerning the non-marital sexual activi-
ties of females. Only after this examination will it be possible to
determine how the average jury reacts to evidence of the rape
complainant's sexual history.
It has been observed that the American society, as a whole,
limits its women to a very rigid standard of sexual chastity. 0 '
100. The American jury is composed primarily of people from the white,
middle-class. The upper-class (professionals and business executives) are
noticeably absent from such juries. The body of law governing the selection
of jurors exempts professional people from jury duty in almost every Amer-
ican jurisdiction. The typical exemption statute exempts many of the follow-
ing: state officials, judges, lawyers, doctors, policemen, firemen, ministers,
pharmacists, teachers, mail carriers, clerks, undertakers, veterinarians, etc.
Furthermore, the unattractive economic sacrifices incident to jury service
eliminates many executives and businessmen.
Persons actively engaged in production who might be expected to
possess superior character-gauging and intellectual qualities are the
very persons who have an economic stake in inventing excuses suf-
ficient to secure relief from jury duty.
D. Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions? 21 U. CHI. L.
REv. 390, 391 (1954). See also G. WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILT 271-72
(3d ed. 1963).
A large proportion of the lower-class, the poor and many blacks, is
likewise excluded from jury service. In some jurisdictions, the jurors are
chosen from voting lists. As a result, the lower-class cultural minorities of
migrant farm workers and southern blacks who have recently immigrated to
northern cities fail to meet the necessary residency requirements and are
excluded from voting lists, and hence, juries. Also, since the lower-class
has a tendency to be more apathetic to voting than the other classes, members
of this lower-class are less likely to register to vote, thus lessening their num-
ber from the jury rolls. Other juror standards, such as the requirements
of average intelligence or literacy, also limits the lower-class from jury
membership. The excusing of a juror for financial hardship results in a
further exclusion of a disproportionate number of poor people and racial
minorities. J. Rhine, The Jury, A Reflection of the Prejudices of the Com-
munity, at 192-95, in J. SILVA, AN INTRODUCTION TO CRIME AND JUSTICE 190-91
(1973).
101. See OLIVER, supra note 6, at 34. See also McCARY, supra note 77,
at 205.
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It is believed that women are not to engage in either premarital
or extra-marital sexual affairs. Religious and societal taboos
against non-marital sex have continued vitality. 2 In fact, almost
all sexual activity between consenting adults, except sexual inter-
course between husband and wife, has been deemed illicit in our
society.'0 3 That class of Americans seemingly most opposed to the
female's non-marital sexual conduct is the predominantly white,
middle class.' 4
Condemnation of women's premarital sexual activities still
permeates this culture. 5 Four major premarital sexual standards
exist: (1) abstinence, which forbids intercourse to both sexes;
(2) the double standard, which allows bachelors to have coitus,
but not unmarried females; (3) permissiveness with affection,
which accepts coitus for both sexes when a stable affectionate re-
lationship is present; and (4) permissiveness without affection,
which accepts premarital intercourse for both sexes on a volun-
tary basis regardless of affection.' °6 Of these four standards the
latter two are considered too radical for most Americans and are
not expected to ever become the dominant standard.0 " Of these
remaining choices, the middle class still holds abstinence as the
dominant code for the unmarried females.0
8
In analyzing the attitudes of certain types of people instead
of particular classes, one reaches the same result: the people most
102. See R. BELL, PREMARITAL SEX IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 44 (1966).
These societal mores are reflected in the state statutes; e.g., fornication
has been made a crime in forty states, while adultery is a crime in forty-five
states.
103. OLIVER, supra note 6, at 207-10.
104. C. Chilman, Some Social and Psychological Aspects of Sex Edu-
cation, in THE INDIVIDUAL, SEX, AND SOCIETY, supra note 74, at 70.
105. KINSEY, supra note 64, at 285.
106. I. Reiss, Premarital Sexual Stadards in THE INDIVIDUAL, SEX, AND
SOCIETY, supra note 74, at 111-13.
107. Id.
108. Id. See also Kaats & Davis, The Dynamics of Sexual Behavior of
College Students, in SEXUAL DEVELOPMENTS AND BEHAVIOR, supra note 70, at
214-29. This article demonstrated that the double standard is quite pronounced
on the college campus in the attitudes of both males and females alike. Al-
though 60% of the males and over 40% of the females had engaged in pre-
marital sex, both sexes believed virginity was much more important for
females than for males. Also, both sexes strongly agreed that having sexual
intercourse is much more injurious to a female's reputation than to a male's-
the difference between the campus tramp and the campus cassanova. The
merging picture for females was one of disapproval of non-marital coitus
both by close friends and relatives, even when the female was in love with
her sexual partner.
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likely to be jurors strongly disfavor female participation in pre-
marital sex. Those categories of Americans which best accept
premarital sex are professional men and black men; 09 and, as
noted earlier, these are among the people least likely to serve on
the jury. Conversely, some of those people which least tolerate
premarital sex-the white females" ' and the middle-aged married
persons"'-are very likely to be predominantly represented on
the jury.
As previously indicated, many rape complainants are likely
to be married women with extra-marital sexual histories. " 2 As
might be expected, this type of sexual activity is also discounte-
nanced by the majority of the middle class.
Such behavior is condemned in practically all Western
cultures because of the threat it poses to the family unit.
Adultery, furthermore, is unequivocally condemned in
Judaic-Christian moral theology. Nevertheless, at no time
in the history of any culture has man's extramarital
coition been consistently controlled or severely punished,
whereas women have universally been subjected to a
much more stringent code of sexual ethics."'
It is evident from the foregoing that the average jury carries
an inherent prejudice against those females who are sexually ac-
tive outside of the marriage confines. It is with this basic atti-
tude against such female sexuality that the jury hears the evi-
dence and deliberates its verdict.
109. I. Reiss, How and Why America's Sex Standards Are Changing,
in SEXUAL DEVELOPMENTS AND BEHAVIOR, supra note 70, at 144.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 142. This study concerned married couples of the same ages,
varying only in the fact that some were childless and the others had children
of courting ages. Only 23% of the childless couples were willing to accept
premarital intercourse, while only 13% of the couples with children would
tolerate coitus before marriage. Since the children of the married couples
were of dating age (probably fifteen years of age and over), this would
make the couples of the research about thirty-five years of age and older.
Since over 85% of all persons thirty-five and older are maried (see 1 1970
CENSUS OF POPULATION, pt. 1, Table 203, at 1-640-41), this study represents
a sampling of the attitudes of the majority of the middle-aged persons. See
also Bell & Buerkle, Mother and Daughter Attitudes to Premarital Sexual
Behavior, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LIVING, Nov., 1961, at 391: 88% of the
mothers thought it wrong for a girl not to be a virgin when she marries,
and 12% thought it generally wrong. Less than 1% thought it right in
many situations.
112. See notes 67-69 supra and accompanying text.
113. McCARY, supra note 77, at 233.
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Next, it must be decided whether the jury's attitude against
female sexuality is improperly inflamed in the rape trial with
proof of the complainant's prior sexual activities. Since jurors
are dealing with lives and freedom and not merely money dam-
ages, the emotional pressures operative in civil proceedings are
magnified many-fold in criminal cases."" The result is that the
juror's native prejudices are more easily aroused in the criminal
proceeding. Furthermore, sexual offenses are the type of crim-
inal cases in which juries may be affected by an unusual degree
of emotional prejudice.'15 Thus, the juror's prejudice against
the unchaste female will be very susceptible to agitation in the
rape trial.
The defense attorney, taking advantage of this situation,
often attempts to inflame these prejudices of the average juror.
To do this, he presents evidence of the complainant's prior sexual
activities and he asks the prosecutrix such questions as, "How
many men have you gone to bed with?" Despite this prevalent
practice, the courts have done very little to restrain counsel from
such an inflammatory activity." 6 In fact, the legal profession
often encourages this arousing of the passions of the jurymen.',
The lawyer's professional duty to make the best use of
the juror's emotions is urged in countless treatises on
trial techniques. . . .The advocate who can successfully
appeal to prejudice, arouse the juror's passions, and cloud
the issues, instead of being pilloried by his associates, is
canonized." 8
The judicial system is well aware that the juror in the crim-
inal trial is quite susceptible to inflammatory evidence, and might
very well decide a case based on his own emotions rather than on
the particular facts."" For this reason, the tribunals exclude such
114. The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions?, supra note 100, at
416.
115. See W. CORNISH, THE JURY 196 (1968).
116. See generally The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions?, supra
note 100, at 394.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119.
Many of the doctrines governing the admission of evidence amply
reflect the low esteem in which court's have traditionally held the
average juror's fact-finding abilities. Particularly is this true in such
areas as relevance and materiality, where evidence, if admitted, is
likely to create an unjustifiable prejudice or confuse the issues.
Id. at 397.
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evidence as pertaining to the defendant. 2 ' The Supreme Court
ruled that evidence of the defendant's specific illicit acts (other
than his prior felony convictions) or ill name among his neigh-
bors weighed too heavily upon the jury."' The admission of such
evidence often results in the jury's prejudgment against the one
with the bad record, creating undue prejudice and interfering
with a fair trial. '22 The simple fact is that the jury cannot wisely
interpret such evidence:
The majority of men and women of average intelli-
gence-the class from which most jurors are selected-
are untrained in logical thinking, and are prone to draw
illogical conclusions. They quite naturally believe that a
person who is guilty of an offense of a heinous character
is guilty of the crime for which he is being tried.'23
In one particular example, a defendant had been convicted
for taking indecent liberties with a child. The appellate court, in
reversing the conviction, ruled that the evidence of the defend-
ant's indecent liberties with another child, although restricted in
the trial court to its bearing on his credibility, could not but preju-
dice the jury and unconsciously lead them to the conclusion that
the defendant was in the habit of taking such liberties with little
girls.'
24
Thus, courts have concluded that intimations of past acts of
misconduct, especially those similar to the act in question, are ex-
tremely damaging to the accused. Also recognized is the fact that
merely putting the question to the defense witness creates in the
minds of jurors the impression that the events occurred.'2 ' Courts
have further determined that cautionary and limiting instructions,
copiously provided by the trial judge, do not give the defendant
adequate protection, as they do not prevent the jury from con-
120. See Awkard v. United States, 352 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Grigsby v. Commonwealth, 299 Ky. 721, 187 S.W.2d 259 (1945); State v.
Moore, 278 So. 2d 781 (La. 1972); People v. Luce, 210 Mich. 621, 178 N.W.
54 (1920). This discussion refers to prior illicit acts for which the defend-
ant was not convicted. However, evidence concerning the defendant's prior
convictions is admissible for impeachment purposes.
121. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
122. Id.
123. Grigsby v. Commonwealth, 299 Ky. 721, 724, 187 S.W.2d 259, 263
(1945).
124. People v. Luce, 210 Mich. 621, 622, 178 N.W. 54, 55 (1920).
125. See Jackson v. Dunne, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Awkard v. United
States, 352 F.2d 641, 645-46 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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sidering prior actions in deciding whether the defendant has com-
mitted the crime charged. It is a false assumption that juries
can compartmentalize their minds and hear things for one purpose
and not the other.
2
6
This same logic which prohibits inflammatory evidence as
against the defendant is equally applicable when the evidence is
offered against the complainant. If the jury is likely to reach
illogical conclusions about the defendant from such evidence, it
will probably reach similar illogical conclusions about the com-
plainant. Since evidence of the indecent liberties with one child
might lead a jury to erroneously believe that the defendant was
in the habit of doing this act, it can equally be said that proof of
the complainant's illicit sexual intercourse with one man might
lead the jury to erroneously conclude that she was in the habit
of consenting. The mere question whether the complainant had
engaged in sexual activities with a man other than her husband
is likely to leave the impression ii the mind of the juror that the
event occurred; and the juror (with his views on such illicit sexu-
ality by women) might very possibly develop an unconscious hos-
tility toward the prosecutrix, and, hence, the prosecution's case.
If no limiting instruction can assure the defendant adequate pro-
tection against a wrongful use of the evidence by the jury, it is
similarly true that no limiting instruction can adequately safe-
guard the prosecution and its interest from a wrongful use of the
evidence by the jury. Consequently, the introduction of such in-
flammatory evidence is as wrongful against the complainant as
it is against the defendant. Such an improper evidentiary assault
against the prosecuting witness can only result in injustice.' It
is clear that justice, though due the accused, is due the accuser
also. 8
In light of the juror's prejudice against female unchastity
and his susceptibility to overweigh prior misconduct evidence, the
126. See note 125 supra.
127. See generally United States v. Kearney, 420 F.2d 170, 174 (D.C. Cir.
1969). Kearney involved a prosecution for murder. The defense counsel was
prevented from cross-examining the prosecuting witness concerning whether
or not he was using narcotics at the time of his statement to the police.
The evidence was excluded to prevent undue prejudice and jury confusion.
"Drug addiction which involves social transgression and the possibility of
illegal conduct . . . has potential for prejudice of the jury." Id. at 174. It
is easy to see how proof of one's illicit sexual activity could lead to the same
result.
128. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1933).
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admission of evidence concerning the complainant's prior sexual
involvement creates a substantial danger of unduly arousing the
jury's emotions of prejudice and hostility; the evidence can only
obstruct rather than facilitate the process of ascertaining the
truth. For this reason, any probative value of such evidence is
outweighed by other considerations and requires the evidence's
exclusion.
There is an even more compelling argument for disallowing
such evidence. This evidence not only creates a substantial danger
of undue prejudice, but it also so weighs upon the minds of the
jurors that it actually results in erroneous decisions-decisions
contrary to the facts of the cases. 2 9
Many of these alleged rapes have strong substantiating evi-
dence, as violence has often been exerted against the victim.' 0
Nevertheless, the number of rape trials resulting in acquittals is
exceedingly high. Among a list of twenty-five crimes, including
all major felonies, forcible rape trials resulted in one of the high-
est rates (33%) of acquittals and dismissals.'3 ' Only negligent
manslaughter and simple assaults had higher acquittal rates. Fur-
thermore, less than one-third (32%) of all forcible rape charges
actually resulted in guilty verdicts on the offense charged. Only
four other crimes, including theft and vandalism, had a lower
percentage of guilty verdicts. With the comparatively good chance
of acquittal, the defendant charged with forcible rape will waive
his right to trial by jury or plead guilty much less frequently
than in most other criminal trials.'
3 2
This high acquittal-low jury waiver ratio can be partially
attributed to the admission into evidence of the complainant's
prior sexual activities. Because of the admission of her sexual
history, the jury does not limit itself to the issue of consent at
the moment of the intercourse in question, but goes on to weigh
the woman's conduct in the history of her sexual affairs.' 3
129. Testimony before the Michigan Women's Commission, May 15,
1974, at 6-7. "[T]his sort of evidence is so inflammatory and prejudicial
that it often results in jury acquittals, even in cases where the victim has
been seriously beaten."
130. AMIR, supra note 60, at 155. The study reports that over 85% of
all rapes are accompanied by violence. The particular types of violence are
as follows: roughness (28.5%), non-brutal beatings (24.7%), brutal beatings
(20.4%) and choking (11.5%).
131. R. KNUDTEN, CRIME IN A COMPLEX SOCIETY 723 (1970).
132. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JuRy 26 (1966).
133. Id. at 249.
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It closely, and often harshly, scrutinizes the female com-
plainant and is moved to be lenient with the defendant
whenever there are suggestions of contributory behavior
on her part."'
The American Jury"5 cites several examples of juries reach.
ing probably erroneous verdicts as a result of the prejudicial
effect of the evidence of the complainant's sexual history. In one
case, the jaw of the complaining witness was fractured in two
places. Despite the savage sexual assault, the jury acquitted the
defendant when it learned that the couple had previously dated,
and therefore, the complainant may have consented to the sexual
intercourse in issue."" In another case, the jury's reaction was
equally disturbing. Three men kidnapped a girl from the street
and took her to an apartment where they brutally attacked her.
It developed during the course of the trial that the young un-
married girl had two illegitimate children. In addition, the de-
fendant claimed that she was a prostitute without offering any
substantiating evidence. Nevertheless, the verdict was "not guilty,"
and as observed by the judge, a "travesty of justice" resulted."'
When the rape cases are further divided into aggravated and
simple rape classifications,"' the erroneous verdicts of the jury
become even more apparent. As revealed in one particular study,'3"
the percentage of jury disagreement with the judge (where the
jury acquits the defendant when the judge would have convicted
him) is 12 percent in the aggravated rape trials. However, in
simple rape cases, this jury disagreement with the presiding judge
soars to 60 percent. In over one-half of these sample trials in-
volving simple rape, the jury acquitted the defendant when the
judge would have convicted him. This analysis can be taken an
important step further. In the ten sample cases of simple rape
where the judge and jury agreed to convict, the jury exercised
its option of convicting the defendant on a lesser charge nine out
of ten times, whereas the judge would have convicted on the lesser
charge in only four of the cases. The result of the sample is
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 251.
137. Id.
138. Aggravated rape is defined in THE AMERICAN JURY as the rape
where there is extrinsic evidence of violence, or where several assailants
were involved, or when the defendant and victim are complete strangers.
Simple rape involves all non-aggravated rapes. See note 132 supra, at 252.
139. THE AMERICAN JURY, supra note 132, at 253.
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startling. Of the forty-two simple rape cases tried, the jury con-
victed the defendant of rape in only three of them. The jury
either acquitted or found the defendant guilty on a lesser charge
in twenty of the twenty-one times when the judge would have
convicted the defendant for rape. This indicates quite conclu-
sively that the jury often disregards the facts in reaching its
verdicts.14 The jury frequently redefines the crime of rape on
the basis of its attitudes against an unchaste woman-not saying
the defendant did no wrong, but that the complainant was at fault.
In considering this problem of erroneous jury acquittals, one
must also consider the doctrine of jury-nullification-that which
protects the jury's general verdict of "not guilty" in a criminal
case from being reversed by the court.'4 ' Although juries in civil
cases are subject to the control of courts with the possibility of
the judge ordering a new trial or setting aside the verdict, no
comparable control evolved for acquittals in criminal cases. As
Justice Holmes acknowledged, "the jury has the power to bring
in a verdict in the teeth of both law and fact.' ' 4 2 Thus, the jury
is free to disregard the facts of the rape case and render its
verdict based on its own attitudes and emotions. The result is
unjustly devastating to the prosecution's attempt to protect so-
ciety from the criminal act of rape.
The nullification doctrine need not be abolished to solve the
problem. In United States v. Dougherty,"3 Chief Judge Bazelon
suggested an alternative solution:
In any case, the real problem in this situation is not the
nullification doctrine, but the values and prejudice that
prompt the acquittal. And the solution is not to condemn
the nullification power, but to spotlight the prejudice and
parochial values that underlie the verdict in the hope
that the public outcry will force re-examination of those
140. Id. at 253-54.
141. In United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
Chief Judge Bazelon stated:
The juror motivated by prejudice seems to me more likely to make
spontaneous use of the power to nullify, and more likely to disregard
the judge's exposition of the normally controlling legal standards.
Id. at 1141 (concurring in part and dissenting in part opinion).
See also M.R. Kadish, Freedom and Obligations of the Criminal Jury,
59 CALIF. L. REv. 905 (1971); A. Scheflin, Jury Nullification-Right To Say
"No", 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 168 (1972).
142. Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920).
143. 473 F.2d 1113, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (concurring opinion).
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values and deter their implementation in subsequent
cases.'
44
The values and prejudices that underlie the erroneous acquit-
tals of many rape defendants have been demonstrated. To pre-
vent those prejudices from unduly interfering with subsequent
jury verdicts, the highly inflammatory evidence of the complain-
ant's illicit sexual activities must be excluded from the trial. Such
evidence, whether offered under the guise of proving either her
consent or her lack of credibility, should no longer be permitted
to inflame the passions and prejudice the minds of the jurors. The
unjust prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs any of its
probative value. Therefore, the exclusion of this evidence is nec-
essary to reach justice in the forcible rape trial.
Evidence I8 Unduly Confusing and Time Consuming
It must also be determined whether proof of the complain-
ant's prior sexual activity creates a side issue that will unduly
distract the jury from the main issues and cause an unwarranted
consumption of time. If such confusion or delay does result, this
would sufficiently outweigh the probative value of the evidence
and require its exclusion.
The feats of memory required of jurors are prodigious. In-
asmuch as the legally crucial and legally unimportant aspects of
evidence are not distinguished until the trial is concluded, the
jurors during the trial possess no means of knowing which as-
pects of the testimony they should particularly concern them-
selves with. The ultimate outcome of many trials must often
depend on evidence which a jury considers insignificant until
otherwise informed by the court. Instead of remembering the
details of that which finally proves crucial, the average juror
will probably recall emotional and dramatic incidents which are
legally insignificant. '
If the juror is more likely to remember the emotional inci-
-dents of the trial, with his attitude proscribing female sexuality
outside of the marriage confines,"4 6 he quite possibly will best
remember and, thus overemphaisze evidence of the complainant's
prior unchaste activities-distracting the juror from other issues.
144. Id.
145. The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions?, supra note 100, at
892.
146. See notes 100-13 supra and accompanying text.
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As mentioned earlier, the end result of admitting such evidence
will be to put the victim on trial along with the defendant."' The
jury must determine not only whether the defendant raped the
complainant, but also whether the complainant was of such moral
turpitude that she could not help but to consent to the sexual in-
tercourse in question. By trying the victim, the central focus is
removed from the defendant's actions.' 8 The difficulty for the
juror in trying two cases simultaneously (such a problem being
unique in the rape trial"'9 ) is apparent, and could only tend to
confuse the jury rather than help it ascertain the truth.
Evidence of the complainant's sexual history, when admitted
to prove her consent to the alleged act, distracts the jury from
the other facts of the case. However, the evidence is even more
confusing to the jury when it is admitted to impeach the prosecu-
trix's credibility. When used in that capacity, the evidence is
offered only for the limited purpose of proving her unreliability
as a witness. Yet, as ascertained earlier, cautionary instructions
so confuse the jury that they have little protective value.' 0 The
jury often ignores the limitations and uses such proof substan-
tively to prove the complainant's consent to the act in issue. The
prosecution, all the while, is powerless to prevent its cause from
being irretrievably obscured and confused."'
To properly affect the credibility of the witness, past mis-
conduct must indicate a lack of veracity.'52 Even if the jury uses
the evidence for its proper purpose, the impeachment by a method
so loose and inconclusive merely exposes witnesses to undeserved
obloquy.'53 Proof of unchastity does not appropriately reveal this
lack of veracity. The evidence only distracts the jury without
purpose. 5"'
If proof of unchastity should be held admissible, rebutting
evidence would also be allowable. Thus, there would be one or
147. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
148. C. Sitemer, New State Laws Rushed to Aid Rape Victims, The
Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 8, 1974, at 5, col. 1.
149. See MICHIGAN WOMEN'S TASK FORCE ON RAPE, Background
Material For Criminal Code Reform To Respond To Michigan's Rape Crisis,
(J. BenDor, Coordinator), at 6.
150. See notes 125-26 supra and accompanying text.
151. Cf. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
152. State v. Williams, 337 Mo. 884, 892, 87 S.W.2d 175, 183 (1935).
153. Robinson v. Atterbury, 135 Conn. 517, 66 A.2d 593 (1949).
154. State v. Schutte, 97 Conn. 462, 117 A. 508 (1922).
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more collateral issues to occupy the time and divert the attention
of the jury.5 '
Such would be the evils if the prosecution could require
previous and timely notice of the particulars of the in-
tended attack upon the conduct of the complainant, but
as no such notice can be exacted, there would be no
means of meeting the evidence, often of the dissolute
companions of the accused, however mistaken or corrupt
it might be, and thus the character of the innocent and
greatly abused female might be sacrificed and the ends
of public justice be defeated." 6
Case authority further supports the proposition that evidence
of specific acts of immorality and unchastity can only serve to
prolong the trial and divert the attention of the trier of fact from
the issues.""7 One court even maintained that to permit such proof
would open the gates of circumstantial evidence as to every act
and statement of the female in her past life; and any such con-
duct could be implied as an admission to consensual sexual inter-
course with the defendant at the time in question. '58
Since proof of the complainant's acts of unchastity could only
create collateral and unduly distracting and confusing issues, the
introduction of such evidence tends merely to frustrate the jury's
attempt to ascertain the truth. Consequently, even if the evidence
has some probative value, its resulting confusion and delay, com-
bined with its prejudicial effect, clearly outweighs its relevancy-
requiring its exclusion from the rape trial.
RECENT LEGISLATION
A few states (California, Florida, Indiana, Iowa and Michi-
gan) have recently passed legislation concerning the admissibility
in the rape trial of evidence of the complainant's prior con-
sensual sexual activity. Several other states are considering simi-
lar legislation, including among others, Arizona, Illinois, Kansas,
Nevada, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Washington.'59
The new laws that are most restrictive of such evidence are
155. People v. Jackson, 3 Park Cr. 398 (1857).
156. Id.
157. See Rice v. State, 35 Fla. 236, 17 So. 286 (1895); Black v. State,
119 Ga. 746, 47 S.E. 370 (1904); Commonwealth v. McKay, 294 N.E.2d
213 (Mass. 1973) ; Moffett v. State, 233 Miss. 276, 78 So. 2d 142 (1955).
158. Black v. State, 119 Ga. 746, 47 S.E. 370 (1904).
159. See Letter from C. Living, Adm. Asst. to Mich. State Senator G.
Byker to Rick A. Mason, Sept. 30, 1974 (on file at Valparaiso University
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those of Indiana,' 0 Michigan"' and California.' 2 Indiana's "rape-
shield" law provides:
In a prosecution for the crime of rape . . evidence of
the victim's past sexual conduct, opinion evidence of the
victim's past sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of
the victim's past sexual conduct may not be admitted,
nor may reference be made thereto in the presence of
the jury, except as provided in this chapter.'63
This Indiana statute permits two narrow exceptions to the
otherwise absolute rule of non-admission of such sexual history
evidence. The first exception, in accord with the overwhelming
weight of authority,'" allows the introduction of evidence con-
cerning the victim's past sexual conduct with the defendant.'"8
The second exception permits evidence which in a specific in-
stance of sexual activity shows that some person other than
the defendant committed the act upon which the prosecution is
founded. 66 This category allows evidence concerning sexual ac-
tivity of the alleged victim with third persons if that evidence
would better demonstrate the source or origin of semen, preg-
nancy, disease, etc.'"'
Before the defense can introduce any of this exceptional evi-
dence, the judge must find that such evidence "is material to a
fact at issue in the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial
nature does not outweigh its probative value ... ,"," Further-
more, the statute imposes additional safeguards to protect against
the admission of improper evidence. The defense must file at
least ten days before trial a written motion, accompanied by an
affidavit, stating its offer to prove such evidence and its rele-
vancy to the case.'69 If the court determines that the offer of
proof is sufficient, the victim shall be questioned regarding the
offer of proof at a hearing out of the presence of the jury.' 0 If
School of Law); Chicago Tribune, May 19, 1974, § 1, at 12; The Christian
Science Monitor, supra note 148.
160. IND. CODE § 35-1-32.5 (1975), amending IND. CODE § 35-1 (1971).
161. Mich. S.B. 1207 (1974).
162. Calif. S.B. 1678 (1974).
163. IND. CODE § 35-1-32.5(1) (1975).
164. See notes 42-48 supra and accompanying text.
165. IND. CODE §35-1-32.5(2)(a) (1975).
166. IND. CODE § 35-1-32.5(2) (b) (1975).
167. See Mich. S.B. 1207 (1974).
168. IND. CODE § 35-1-32.5(2) (1975).
169. IND. CODE § 35-1-32.5(3) (a) & (b) (1975).
170. IND. CODE § 35-1-32.5 (3) (c) (1975).
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the court finds from this hearing that such sexual conduct evi-
dence is admissible, the court is required to make an order stating
what evidence may be introduced by the defendant and the nature
of the questions to be permitted.'" The defendant then may offer
evidence pursuant to the order of the court. This Indiana legisla-
tion provides for a similar hearing if new information is dis-
covered during the course of the trial."2 It is also specifically
mentioned that the above provisions do not limit the right of the
accused to impeach the credibility of the prosecutrix by showing
her prior convictions for such sexual-related behavior. " "
The recent rape legislation in Michigan and California is
closely analogous to that of Indiana. These new laws also pro-
hibit the admission of most evidence concerning the complainant's
prior sexual activity with third parties. Michigan essentially al-
lows only evidence of the prosecutrix's sexual relations with the
defendant after such evidence is determined both relevant and
non-prejudicial.' California only permits proof of the complain-
ant's previous sexual conduct with the accused rapist after a rele-
vancy hearing with the judge.'75 The exclusion of evidence con-
cerning the alleged victim's sexual activity with third persons re-
flects a policy decision that all women, not just virgins, are to be
protected by the law.'78 The laws were passed to shield the au-
tonomy of the woman-maintaining her ability to make an indi-
vidual decision in respect to each person.'" The legislators of
these states determined that the jury should no longer be able to
presume that because a woman consented to sexual intercourse
with others, it is more likely that she consented to the defendant
at the time in question. " 8 These legislatures concluded that such
collateral evidence is so confusing, inflammatory and prejudicial
that its use greatly outweighs its probative value.' 9
171. IND. CODE § 35-1-32.5(3) (1975).
172. Id.
173. IND. CODE § 35-1-32.5(4) (1975).
174. Mich. S.B. 1207 (1974).
175. The Christian Science Monitor, supra note 148.
176. Testimony Before the Michigan Women's Commission, supra note
129, at 7; V. Nordby, Legal Effects of Proposed Rape Reform Bills, Mich. S.B.
1207, Mich. H.B. 5802, at ii.
177. Letter from Camille LeGrand, Associate in Law, University of
California School of Law (Berkley), to California Legislators, Mar. 14, 1974,
at 10-11.
178. Id.
179. Testimony Before the Michigan Women's Commission, supra note
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The legislation of these three states prevents many of the
inequities of present rape proceedings. First, it prohibits the in-
troduction of the irrelevant and unduly prejudicial evidence con-
cerning the complainant's sexual activities with third parties, ex-
cept that which shows that a person other than the defendant is
responsible for the act upon which the defendant is accused. Sec-
ondly, these statutes prevent the defense from conducting "fish-
ing expeditions"-asking the prosecutrix unfounded sexual-related
questions in front of the jury. This type of questioning is pro-
hibited by the required hearings in the judge's chambers. Indi-
ana's statute is particularly effective because it requires a court
order which limits in scope the questions that may be asked as
well as the references that may be made before the jury. It should
also be noted that these hearings alleviate much undue surprise,
which was once a major problem faced by prosecutors.80
Despite the exclusion of evidence relating to her sexual con-
duct with a third person, these newly-enacted statutes still per-
mit the admission of evidence concerning the prior sexual activity
between the complainant and the defendant. It has already been
established that the prior intercourse of the complainant with the
defendant is properly admissible evidence. 8 ' However, there may
remain a problem with admitting that evidence concerning the
complainant's prior sexual intimacy short of intercourse with the
defendant. As previously mentioned, it is very possible that such
evidence may not be relevant,"8 2 and it is much more likely that
its undue prejudicial effect will require its exclusion. Fortunately,
the statutes of Indiana and Michigan still require this evidence
to be proven relevant and non-prejudicial before it is admitted.
By subjecting it to this dual test, it is less probable that the ir-
relevant and unduly prejudicial sexual-intimacy evidence will be
admitted. However, California's legislation is much more proble-
matic, since it only requires that such evidence be determined
relevant before its admission. The California law does not de-
mand that the evidence be adjudged non-prejudicial. Since the
prejudicial test is not applied to this offered evidence, California
permits the admission of the unduly prejudicial evidence concern-
ing the complainant's sexual intimacy short of intercourse with
the defendant. This, perhaps, is the major flaw with what is
otherwise very sound legislation.
180. See generally People v. Jackson, 3 Park Cr. 398 (1857).
181. See notes 82-87 supra and accompanying text.
182. See notes 76-81 supra and accompanying text.
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The laws of Florida and Iowa are not nearly as restrictive
as are those statutes in Indiana, Michigan and California. The
Florida and Iowa legislation permits testimony regarding the vic-
tim's sexual history if the judge in a closed hearing determines
that such is pertinent to the case.' 3 Hopefully, "pertinent" means
relevant, but even then, the statutes are deficient. Before such
evidence is admitted, it should be both relevant and non-prejudi-
cial. However, there is no mention by these latter statutes that
the second test will be applied. There is no indication that if such
evidence is unduly prejudicial or inflammatory, it will be excluded.
This legislation is clearly insufficient to meet the inherent prob-
lems of such evidence. Although the effect of this legislation may
exclude from the presence of the jury some sexual-related ques-
tions, the judge, in his discretion, could admit all sexual miscon-
duct evidence. Without the statutory exclusion, much evidence
which should be excluded for its irrelevancy or its prejudicial
effect will continue to be admitted in at least some circumstances.
Consequently, such statutes are not sufficient to prevent inappro-
priate evidence from being presented to the jury. The result is
that the jury will hear the evidence, which may lead to a wrong-
ful acquittal of some defendants. This type of legislation, there-
fore, does not really remedy the chief problems currently pre-
sented in the prosecutions for rape. Although the legislation is a
step in the right direction, it clearly stops short of the most nec-
essary and desirous resolution.
CONCLUSION
Every woman, regardless of her private sexual activities,
should be protected from violence and should have the right to
live both peaceably and safely.
It seems quite evident that women who have active sex
lives deserve as full protection of the law as "chaste"
women. The act of rape is as wrong against a prostitute
as a virgin. The key to the prosecution should be the
facts of the alleged incident, not the sexual habits of the
complainant." 4
Rape laws were not designed to protect only virgins and faithful
wives. Even the unchaste and promiscuous woman deserves the
183. The Christian Science Monitor, supra note 148.
184. May 1, 1974, Memorandum from D. LeDuc, the Office of Criminal
Justice Programs, State of Michigan, to Governor W. Milliken, analyz-
ing Mich. S.B. 1207 (1974).
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right to be protected from unlawful invasion of her body. No
longer should the rapist have an opportunity to escape punish-
ment by the stratagem of smearing the victim's sexual reputation
and making her personal life the major and perhaps controlling
issue in the case.'8 5
Evidence of the complainant's prior sexual misconduct except
as pertaining to proof of her consensual sexual intercourse with
the defendant is irrelevant, as it proves neither her consent to
the disputed sexual act nor her lack of credibility as a witness.
In addition, the highly prejudicial, inflammatory and confusing
nature of the evidence clearly outweighs any probative value the
evidence may have. The admission of such evidence can only
cloud the issues and frustrate the jury's attempts to ascertain the
truth of the case. Because of the admission of such evidence, the
jury is more likely to, and often does, reach erroneous verdicts.
On many occasions a defendant is acquitted despite sometimes
clear factual evidence of his criminal involvement in that rape.
A criminal defendant is not deprived of his constitutional
rights by the exclusion of evidence concerning the prosecutrix's
sexual history. The accused in the rape proceeding reserves the
right to impeach the prosecutrix in the same manner as in every
other type of criminal trial. Likewise, the alleged rapist retains
the constitutional safeguards assured a defendant in other crimi-
nal trials: the presumption of innocence and the right to have
his involvement in the criminal act proven beyond a reasonable
doubt before he is found guilty. Thus, the exclusion of evidence
concerning the complainant's sexual history will not result in a
denial of a fair trial to the defendant.
The recent legislation is a step in the right direction, but
much of it is clearly insufficient to overcome the inherent prob-
lems with such evidence. Just the legislation in Indiana, Michi-
gan and California, which allows only the evidence of the com-
plainant's past sexual conduct with the alleged rapist, is appro-
priately comprehensive to sufficiently meet the present inequities
of the rape trial. Still, even this might not be enough. It may be
appropriate only to allow evidence of her prior consensual sexual
intercourse with the defendant and prohibit proof of other inti-
macies with him. Nevertheless, the newly-enacted statutes of
these three states are a good indication of what must be done.
185. Legal Effects of Proposed Rape Reform Bills, Mich. S.B. 1207, Mich.
H.B. 5802, supra note 176.
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With the above exception, evidence concerning the prior sexual
activity of the prosecutrix must be excluded. The exclusion of
this irrelevant and unduly prejudicial evidence is the only way
to prevent the travesty of justice presently experienced in many
rape trials.
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